

Interagency Task Forces

The Right Tools for the Job

Robert S. Pope, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

THE US GOVERNMENT (USG) conducts a host of operations abroad. Some are responses to crises, such as natural disasters, man-made humanitarian emergencies, or an attack on a friendly foreign country. Others are deliberately planned, such as preemptive military strikes or complex postconflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. Still other operations address such long-term issues as countering narcotics trafficking or global terrorism.

In complex operations requiring participants from more than one US agency, coordinated planning and execution at the operational level often is lacking. This leads to redundancies, gaps, friction, and frustration. Several examples herein of US operations abroad highlight both successes and shortcomings. This analysis discusses four organizational reform models and recommends the interagency task force (IATF) as the preferred structure.

Expertise for these many different missions is spread across several executive-branch agencies. The US Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) responds to disasters like the 2004 Asian tsunami and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The military conducts offensive and defensive operations, such as coming to the aid of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia after Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait or removing Saddam Hussein from power in the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. The State Department's (DoS) office of the Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) has been assigned the lead role in postconflict reconstruction and stabilization operations. The DoS Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, together with US law enforcement agencies, most operating under the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), have the leading role in counternarcotics operations abroad.

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While the United States often has an agency or office with a leading role in a particular mission area abroad, that agency usually cannot accomplish the mission alone. For example, the US responses to the 2004 Asian tsunami and 2010 earthquake in Haiti required substantial contributions from the military and the State Department as well as the OFDA. Current operations in Afghanistan combine military counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) operations with the reconstruction and stabilization efforts of a number of agencies, including the State Department, the USAID, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of the Treasury, and the US Geological Survey.¹ Counternarcotics operations outside the United States require assistance from the military and the intelligence community as well as law enforcement and the DoS.

Past and Current Organizational Structures

Before proposing organizational reforms, it is worthwhile to examine the structures used in several past and current US operations abroad to see how these either facilitated or militated against mission success. Four cases are discussed: (1) the Vietnam War, (2) joint interagency task forces (JIATF) for counternarcotics and rule-of-law development, (3) the US response to the 2004 Asian tsunami, and (4) Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. These examples cover a range of missions, including COIN, counternarcotics, CT, development assistance, reconstruction and stabilization, and natural disaster response.

Vietnam (1964–73)—Counterinsurgency with Reconstruction and Stabilization

Initially, US involvement in Vietnam occurred entirely within individual agency (as well as individual military service) “stovepipes.” The military focused first on providing advisors and training to the South Vietnamese military and later on direct military operations. Meanwhile, US civilian agencies—including the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), USAID, Department of Agriculture, and US Information Service—all separately pursued their various agendas, which grew to include many programs that would today be called reconstruction and stabilization, as well as COIN activities, then termed “pacification.” Each agency operated independently in Washington, in Saigon, and at the provincial level throughout South Vietnam. Though the US ambassador in Saigon was

nominally in charge of the civilian agencies operating in South Vietnam, he was not able to effectively supervise and coordinate all the activities that were underway with separate agency budgets, lines of authority, and divergent institutional cultures. The commander of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) met regularly with the ambassador, but coordination between the military and civilian efforts was frequently lacking, and neither the MACV commander nor the ambassador had full authority over US efforts in the country.²

As US involvement expanded, programs grew in size and complexity, and the initially poor interagency coordination worsened further. In response, the president, secretary of defense, and joint chiefs decided that unity of command was required, so in 1967 the USG created the office of Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later “Rural”) Development Support (CORDS).³ Civil development efforts previously supervised by the US Embassy in Saigon were integrated under MACV, placing both military operations and civilian development activities under the MACV commander, who was under the overall authority of the US ambassador to Vietnam (though in practice the MACV commander reported to the military’s US Pacific Command [PACOM], and disputes with the embassy were often elevated to Washington, diminishing the ambassador’s *de facto* authority over MACV).⁴ The civilian director of the CORDS held ambassadorial rank equivalent to a four-star general and exercised control over all interagency assets involved in the counterinsurgency effort. In a significant organizational innovation, the civilian CORDS director was dual-hatted as the MACV deputy to the commander for the CORDS, number three in the military chain of command in Vietnam, behind the MACV commander and the military deputy (see fig. 1).⁵

This construct represents the first time a US ambassador ever worked in the chain of command under a general officer, and it not only brought together the civilian COIN operations under a single leader, but it also integrated the civilian and military COIN efforts. Additionally, because of the CORDS director’s position in the military chain of command, it provided the civilian counterinsurgency leader with regular access to the military commander and, therefore, to military personnel, logistics, equipment, and funding. The CORDS structure, from the headquarters down through the provinces and hamlets, was an integrated civil-military organization.⁶ Richard Stewart, chief historian of the US Army Center for Military History, described the integration:

Military personnel were . . . put in charge of civilians [and] civilians were . . . put in charge of military personnel to create a truly mixed, interagency team based on skills and abilities, not agency loyalty. . . . When a senior civilian was assigned to a key . . . position, almost invariably he had a military assistant reporting to him and the reverse was true when a military officer was in the principal slot. This blending of military and civilian authority included the use of the power of personnel evaluation or rating authority.⁷




Figure 1. MACV-CORDS organizational structure

While the creation of the integrated civil-military COIN organization vastly improved interagency unity of effort, developing and maintaining the organization faced significant bureaucratic hurdles. The military was generally supportive of the CORDS construct, but civilian agencies were less so.⁸ Stewart points to severe bureaucratic shortfalls:

Presidential leadership proved vital in overcoming the single greatest obstacle to mission success—the reluctance of Washington officials and senior leaders in the field to relinquish control over field operations. The State Department . . . resisted the idea that any of its development or pacification assets should fall under a mili-

tary chain of command, even one headed by a civilian. Even after several broad hints from the [Johnson] administration, a presidential intervention was needed to change their minds.⁹

Once the CORDS was established, its director had to continually fight Washington-based bureaucratic attempts to reduce its funding, shrink its structure, limit its scope, and keep additional programs from coming under its control.¹⁰ This bureaucratic resistance to formal interagency command structures is probably a primary reason the USG has not used more structures like the CORDS in the decades after Vietnam. While the CORDS produced unity of effort through unity of command and solved the problem of resource asymmetries between military and civilian agencies by providing the civilian agencies with access to military resources, the civilian agencies were never comfortable with the arrangement.¹¹

Joint Interagency Task Forces

The Department of Defense (DoD) has attempted to improve interagency unity of effort at the operational level through the creation of joint interagency task forces, which bring together several federal agencies to accomplish an operational-level mission. The US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), the combatant command charged with military-wide joint doctrine, transformation, and organizational standardization, defines a JIATF as “an interagency organization under a single military director that coordinates counterdrug operations at the operational and tactical level.”¹²

The JIATF is “not fully developed in joint doctrine.”¹³ Indeed, current US joint military doctrine mentions JIATFs in only three publications: Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*; JP 3-05.1, *Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*; and JP 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction* (WMD).¹⁴ Thus, while JFCOM’s definition limits the JIATF construct to the counternarcotics mission, the concept is at least mentioned in doctrine dealing with special operations and counter-WMD missions.¹⁵

The JIATF not only receives mere brief mention in military doctrine, but also the construct is neither codified in executive order nor legislation. It derives its authority through a memorandum of agreement signed by the head of each participating agency or department.¹⁶ A JFCOM white paper notes that while agencies subordinate some of their assets under another agency’s leadership in a JIATF, these JIATFs do not have true unity of command because “the different agencies still retain many of their

authorities, responsibilities, and prerogatives.”¹⁷ However, many of the participating agency and department field-level headquarters are collocated in the JIATF integrated staff structure, enabling the organization to cut across traditional agency stovepipes and facilitate rapid, integrated action.¹⁸

Two long-standing JIATFs stand out: JIATF-West (JIATF-W) under US PACOM and JIATF-South (JIATF-S) under US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).¹⁹ Each dates from 1989 and is focused on the counter-narcotics mission.²⁰ In a departure from the JFCOM definition, these two JIATFs are led not by military officers but by Coast Guard rear admirals, who fall under the DHS rather than the DoD.

JIATF-W is PACOM’s executive agent for DoD support to counter-narcotics initiatives in the PACOM area of responsibility (AOR). It provides interagency intelligence fusion, supports US law enforcement, and develops partner-nation counternarcotics capabilities in the AOR with the goal of detecting, disrupting, and dismantling narcotics-related transnational threats in the region. Initially established in California in 1989 as Joint Task Force 5, in 1994 it was renamed and granted additional interagency authorities and in 2004 was collocated with PACOM headquarters in Hawaii. JIATF-W consists of “approximately 82 uniformed and civilian members of all five military services as well as representatives from the national intelligence community and US federal law enforcement agencies,” including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).²¹

JIATF-W has used its interagency mix of capabilities to achieve counter-narcotics goals in the region by deploying intelligence analysts to US embassies in the PACOM AOR supporting US law enforcement agencies; constructing interagency intelligence fusion centers for partner nations in the region; constructing infrastructure, such as border patrol stations and customs checkpoints in partner nations; and conducting counternarcotics training for partner-nation militaries and law enforcement agencies.²²

JIATF-S in Key West, Florida, was created in 1999 by consolidating two other counternarcotics task forces which the DoD had established in 1989.²³ The mission of JIATF-S is to detect, monitor, and consign suspected narcotics trafficking targets to appropriate law enforcement agencies, promote regional security cooperation, and coordinate US country-team and partner-nation counternarcotics initiatives.²⁴ Because the Posse Comitatus Act places limits on the use of the US military in federal law enforcement, military personnel and assets in JIATF-S can detect and

monitor counternarcotics targets, but enforcement actions must be executed by law enforcement agencies. Since these law enforcement agencies are part of the JIATF, the transition from military monitoring to law enforcement action “happens with little or no disruption.”²⁵

JIATF-S has an integrated interagency structure, including a USCG rear admiral as its director, an officer from Customs and Border Protection (CBP) as vice director, a senior Foreign Service officer (FSO) as the director’s foreign policy advisor (FPA), and participants from all US military services, the USCG, CBP, DEA, FBI, ICE, and elements of the US intelligence community, including the CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), and National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGIA). Interagency leadership continues through the lower levels of the organization as well; the directors for intelligence and operations are both military officers, the deputy for intelligence is from the DEA, and the deputy for operations is from CBP.²⁶ This integrated structure includes an important integrating element—all personnel assigned to JIATF-S, regardless of their parent agency, are evaluated by their bosses on the task force rather than someone from their parent agency, giving JIATF-S the all-important ability to reward personnel for their job at the task force rather than for loyalty to their agency or department.²⁷

JIATF-S is a multinational organization, with participants from countries inside and outside the SOUTHCOM AOR working together, both at the headquarters and in combined force packages across the region. France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom (all of which govern territories in the AOR) provide ships, aircraft, and liaison officers to the task force, and the commander of the Netherlands Forces Caribbean also commands a subordinate task group. There are liaison personnel from six different AOR nations plus Mexico. This robust liaison program not only facilitates operational cooperation, it also improves information sharing across the region.²⁸ The JIATF-S organizational structure is shown in figure 2.

Some observers have concluded that JIATF-S is the benchmark interagency organization to emulate. Dr. John Fishel, who has written extensively on civil-military relations, stated that this model is an appropriate organizational construct “to coordinate the activity of many interagency players.”²⁹ LCDR Tom Stuhlreyer, USCG, asserts that JIATF-S is effective and makes best use of limited US resources across the interagency. He notes that narcotics seizure records were being broken at a time when fewer US military assets were available due to high operational require-

ments in the global war on terror, demonstrating “the efficacy and force-multiplying aspect of the joint, interagency, and multi-national approach to operations at JIATF-South.”³⁰ The Government Accountability Office (GAO) credits SOUTHCOM with more success than other combatant commands in its interagency collaboration, in part due to the effect of the JIATF-S organization.³¹




Figure 2. JIATF-S organizational structure

According to Fishel, “The real reason JIATF-S works is that it is structurally an organization that has unity of command. The director is a commander with the authority to hire and fire, as well as to task, organize, and direct actions.”³² However, because JIATFs are not codified in executive order or legislation, the authority remains largely voluntary. Stuhlreyer characterizes the JIATF as an interagency “coalition of the willing” and notes that, while assigned military personnel are subject to normal military order and discipline, the interagency partners “are only obligated to remain invested in JIATF-South as long as the command assists them in achieving individual interagency goals.”³³

Asian Tsunami (2004–05)—Natural Disaster Response

Media reporting on a disaster or humanitarian crisis tends to focus on the military portion of the response, despite the USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance as the lead US agency. The military is frequently the

first and most visible responder with vastly more personnel and equipment than any other US agency.

The response to the 26 December 2004 Asian tsunami provides a good example of a semi-coordinated US interagency response to a humanitarian crisis. The tsunami stretched across South Asia and the coast of Africa and required “the largest humanitarian relief and recovery operation the world has ever seen in the wake of a natural disaster.”³⁴ The US response began within hours of the tsunami. Because the USG lacked a coherent, formalized, interagency approach, the USAID, the DoS, the military, and other federal agencies each began responding individually, using their own procedures.³⁵

PACOM led the military response to the disaster and quickly put its joint operations center (JOC) on 24/7 operations. It established a joint task force called Combined Support Force-536 (CSF-536) to conduct military humanitarian response operations. While “Combined” in a unit designation generally refers to a coalition military operation, CSF-536 never exercised operational control over non-US military forces responding to the disaster. Still, much of the international military effort relied on the robust command, control, and communications capabilities provided by the American force. CSF-536 in turn established subordinate combined support groups (CSG) for each country in which the United States responded with significant military forces, and each CSG supported the US ambassador and interagency country team in that country. At the peak of the operation, over 17,000 US military personnel participated.³⁶

Because many disasters substantially disrupt local transportation and communication infrastructure, one of the most urgent tasks of the relief effort is providing logistics, transportation, and communication. The CSGs executed search and rescue operations, transported and distributed relief supplies, provided emergency transportation, and contributed to the overall assessment of the disaster. As logistics and transportation infrastructures begin to recover and local government, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and other responding nonmilitary agencies reach sufficient capability, the military requirement may end relatively early in the response, while other agencies may be engaged for many months or even years.³⁷

The USAID also responded quickly to the tsunami. Its OFDA sent disaster assistance response teams (DART) to the affected countries, together with culturally proficient experts to act as liaisons with the host government and local population. The first mission of the DARTs was to

assess the impact of the disaster so relief assistance could be tailored to each country's needs and to the ability of the local infrastructure to receive the aid. Because of the vast size of the affected area, the OFDA provided some training to US military special operations forces and Marine units so they could augment the DARTs. Additionally, OFDA sent a two-man team to PACOM to act as a liaison between PACOM, OFDA headquarters in Washington, and the DART teams in the field.³⁸

In each affected country, the US ambassador acted as the overall coordinator of US efforts in that country. The embassies for many of the affected countries had a disaster contingency plan in place, which gave the State Department a starting point for its response. When the tsunami occurred, the embassies developed disaster relief coordination mechanisms with the host government, other diplomatic missions in the country, local NGO representatives, and the US military. They also established status of forces agreements with the local governments, facilitated information flow between the United States and the host nation, and smoothed the flow of relief supplies through customs. In each country, the embassy played a leading role in tailoring the US response, both in terms of the need and the method in which local governments would accept foreign assistance.³⁹

To coordinate interagency policy efforts in Washington, the DoS, USAID, and PACOM formed an ad hoc cooperative arrangement. At the regional level, PACOM attempted to provide interagency coordination by establishing a joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) specifically for the disaster response and separate from its standing JIACG.⁴⁰ The two-person liaison team sent by the OFDA to PACOM initially worked in this disaster response JIACG but quickly moved to the PACOM JOC, where it was in a much better position to provide situational awareness to the military and serve in a liaison role with Washington and the OFDA teams in the field.

The disaster response JIACG experiment was unsuccessful; the emergency relief phase was largely over before the new JIACG could get organized. However, the OFDA liaison team was very successful in fostering a high degree of mutual confidence among the US interagency participants and thus led to extensive interagency cooperation in the response operations.⁴¹ The interagency organizational structure for the response to this natural disaster is shown in figure 3.

The US response is generally considered a success. The interagency coordination process worked well at the country level in the various embassies,

the regional military response was effective, and USAID's OFDA played its key role, though coordination of these efforts across the region was ad hoc.




Figure 3. Interagency organization for US response to 2004 Asian tsunami

For single-country disasters this may be good enough, but disasters which affect several countries could be better addressed with a regionally coordinated response. While there is no formal interagency doctrine, process, or organization above the embassy level for US disaster response operations, PACOM's long experience of humanitarian relief planning, exercises, and operations—many times in concert with local partner countries and other US agencies—provided a starting point for the ad hoc regional interagency response to the disaster.⁴²

Afghanistan (2001–Present)—Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism

More than nine years of US operations in Afghanistan have provided the opportunity for a steady evolution of thinking about the need for more-effective, formal coordination of the civil-military COIN campaign. As Operation Enduring Freedom commenced in October 2001, initial coordination was only between the military and the intelligence community (primarily the CIA) for the rapid planning and execution of operations

against al-Qaeda and the Taliban-led government of Afghanistan with minimum use of US forces. Even after the Taliban regime was toppled and large numbers of US forces reached Afghanistan, poor coordination remained between the military, development, and diplomatic communities.

Once the United States reestablished an embassy in Kabul in late 2002, an opportunity for increased civil-military coordination and unity of effort was largely wasted, while the embassy pursued developmental efforts and the reestablishment of the government of Afghanistan. The US military, under LTG Dan McNeill and LTG John Vines, focused on the CT mission. General Vines was emphatic that the military mission was CT and not COIN or nation building, going so far as to prohibit those under his command from using the word *counterinsurgency* to describe their efforts.⁴³

US civil-military coordination in Afghanistan greatly improved in 2003–05 under the next US team, Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad and LTG David Barno. General Barno believed in the importance of civil-military coordination to achieving US goals in Afghanistan, so he moved his living quarters to the US Embassy compound in Kabul, established an office next to Khalilzad's, and attended daily embassy country team meetings. Barno also provided the ambassador with five military planners to work with embassy personnel to form an embassy interagency planning group and produce a coordinated US strategy for Afghanistan. The resulting civil-military strategy shifted the US focus from CT to COIN and nation building, created two regional headquarters to direct all coalition actions in each region, and successfully conducted elections, reduced violence, and began reconstruction.⁴⁴

The Khalilzad/Barno civil-military coordination was personality driven and was neither formalized nor directed by either legislation or executive order. In 2005, when Amb. Ronald Neumann and LTG Karl Eikenberry replaced Khalilzad and Barno, civil-military cooperation effectively ended. General Eikenberry returned the military's focus to CT kill-or-capture operations, which led to an increasing number of civilian casualties and consequently a steep decline in Afghan popular support for the United States.⁴⁵ Political scientist and Afghanistan expert Seth Jones concluded that this “effectively shatter[ed] the military-civilian coordination Khalilzad and Barno had painstakingly fashioned during their tenure together,”⁴⁶ and Senator John McCain said that “Between late 2003 and early 2004, we were moving on the right path in Afghanistan, [but] . . . rather than building on these gains . . . we squandered them. . . . Our integrated civil-

military command structure was disassembled and replaced by a balkanized and dysfunctional arrangement.”⁴⁷

In 2007, Amb. William Wood and GEN Dan McNeill replaced Neumann and Eikenberry. GEN David McKiernan replaced McNeill in 2008. During this period, civil-military relations continued largely as they had under Neumann and Eikenberry, with the military primarily focused on kinetic counterterrorism operations and training the Afghan National Army, while civilian agencies worked independently on diplomatic and developmental goals. In early 2009, late in General McKiernan’s tour, the United States began moving once again toward more civil-military coordination with the creation of an executive working group (EWG), which each month brought together the in-country principals from the DoS, USAID, and the military to discuss civilian and military plans and operations and synchronize interagency efforts. The high-level EWG was supported by a working-level interagency staff called the Integrated Civilian Military Action Group, staffed by State Department personnel from S/CRS, USAID personnel, and US military personnel from the Regional Command East and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).⁴⁸

Many have been critical of the ad hoc nature of US civil-military coordination in Afghanistan. In April 2008 the House Armed Services Committee reported that “rather than depending exclusively on personalities for success, the right interagency structures and processes need to be in place and working.”⁴⁹ A former senior US military commander in Afghanistan identified the most serious challenge in Afghanistan in 2009 as “not the Taliban . . . not governance . . . not security. . . . It’s the utter failure in the unity of effort department.”⁵⁰ In April of that year, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed his lack of satisfaction with McKiernan’s civil-military coordination efforts, saying the NATO ISAF commander needed to focus on “cooperation between civil and military efforts.”⁵¹

The US leadership in Afghanistan changed again in 2009, with retired lieutenant general Karl Eikenberry becoming ambassador on 29 April and GEN Stanley McChrystal becoming the NATO ISAF and US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) commander on 15 June.⁵² Under direction from Washington, the new team quickly set out to develop an integrated civil-military plan. They assembled a planning team led by planners from the S/CRS and including other US civilian agencies as well as the US military from both USFOR-A and ISAF, and on 10 August 2009 released the

Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan over both of their signatures.⁵³

The new plan created a coordinated civil-military decision-making structure at all levels in Afghanistan. At the national level in Kabul, the United States established several interagency groups. The principals group (the ambassador and the commanding general of ISAF and USFOR-A) has responsibility for final coordination and decision making. The EWG (with interagency members from the US Embassy, USFOR-A, and US forces from ISAF) includes a deputies-level body to make policy and decisions. Several mission areas in the campaign plan have national-level working groups, which monitor and assess progress on each mission area in the plan. The political-military section of the embassy provides planning and assessment support for the EWG and national-level working groups. In addition, the civilians at the embassy were reorganized along functional, rather than agency, lines.⁵⁴

In the field, the United States created civilian lead positions at the two regional commands, at each subregional US brigade task force, and for each province. These civilian leads coordinate the activities of all US civilians in Afghanistan at their level and subordinate levels who are operating under the ambassador's authority and also serve as the civilian counterpart to the military commander at that organizational level. This dual role as the leader of US interagency civilians and counterpart to the US military commander is intended to produce civil-military unity of effort at each level. In addition, each region has established an organization, called the regional integrated team, composed of the regional command commander, the US Special Operations Forces commander for that region, the civilian lead, and representatives from US agencies operating in the region. Each regional command also has a civil-military fusion cell, which is responsible for maintaining a common operating picture of the region. Similar civil-military entities operate at the subregional, provincial, and district levels. While these civil-military structures are currently US-only, the campaign plan indicates they could be expanded to include non-US military forces and civilian participants.⁵⁵ The US organizational structure in Afghanistan is shown in figure 4.

While this parallel civilian-military organizational structure (plus the three recent CJIATFs focused on counternarcotics and rule of law) is the closest civil-military coordination the United States has produced in nine years of operations in Afghanistan, it still falls short of the truly integrated CORDS

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


Figure 4. Past and current US organizational structures in Afghanistan

structure employed in Vietnam. Dr. Christopher Lamb, acting director of the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Dr. Martin Cinnamond, who worked in a number of UN positions in Afghanistan in 2007 and 2008, called the new coordination structure insufficient, saying: "It calls for parallel chains of command with coordination at every level. Historically, however, the way to ensure civil-military cooperation is to formally integrate the military and civilian chains of command."⁵⁶

As the previous cases demonstrate, the United States has applied a range of organizational structures to interagency operations abroad. While it can claim some success in interagency foreign endeavors, these successes are often costly in resources, time, and foreign goodwill, as the various elements of the interagency fail to work together in a synchronized manner. The next section describes four potential ways to reorganize the interagency system at the crisis task force level to produce better unity of effort.

Proposed Organizational Reforms

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, which unified the military services into a joint operational team,

there have been numerous studies, books, articles, and papers suggesting ways to improve interagency unity of effort.⁵⁷ After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, most authors focused on problems and solutions particular to the counterterrorism mission. Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, many changed focus to stabilization and reconstruction operations and counterinsurgency warfare. However, relatively few studies have looked at whole-of-government unity of effort across the range of COIN, counternarcotics, CT, development assistance, reconstruction and stabilization, and natural disaster response missions.

For these operational-level deliberative, or crisis-action missions, the organizational reforms proposed over the last two decades generally divide into four categories: an interagency organization, a State Department–led organization, a military-led organization, or a parallel structure. As currently practiced, the closest structures the USG has to operational-level interagency organizations are the JIATFs at SOUTHCOM and PACOM, which combine military, law enforcement, and intelligence-community personnel in a unified structure. There are no current or recent examples of State Department–led subregional interagency organizations for contingency operations, though of course the country team led by the ambassador at every US embassy provides a steady-state example of a DoS–led interagency organization. On the other hand, there are a few examples of military-led interagency organizations, including the MACV–CORDS structure in Vietnam. A parallel structure exists today in Afghanistan, with the embassy and the military joint task force (JTF) coordinating with each other but with neither formally subordinate to the other. There have also been parallel structures during humanitarian response operations, such as the response to the 2004 Asian tsunami, with the military and other agencies coordinating but with neither subordinate to the other. The following sections describe four proposed organizational reform models.

An Interagency Structure

The first operational-level reform model envisions creating an integrated interagency task force for crisis operations, unifying interagency civilian and military efforts and command structures. This structure is similar to the current JIATFs at PACOM and SOUTHCOM, though with increased command authority. The most prominent proponents of this reform model include the Defense Science Board's (DSB) 2004 summer study and the 2008 *Forging a*

New Shield and 2009 *Turning Ideas into Action* reports from the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR).

The 2004 DSB study recommended establishing joint interagency task forces composed of the leaders operating in the area of interest, including the ambassador, the USAID country director, the CIA chief of station, and other senior agency representatives. These would be augmented with DoD personnel as needed to integrate planning with higher organizational levels and ensure coordinated action by all US players.⁵⁸

In their 2008 and 2009 reports, the PNSR team recommended creating integrated interagency crisis task forces (CTF) to conduct crisis operations. The CTFs would have an integrated civil-military chain of command, as shown in figure 5.⁵⁹ A CTF would have a single director, a clear mission, resources, and authority commensurate with assigned responsibilities. The CTF director could be either military or civilian, depending on the security situation, and would be supported by an interagency staff.⁶⁰ The CTF director would report directly to the president through the national security advisor for “large and important”⁶¹ crises and to the director’s respective department (i.e., a lead agency) for less-prominent crises. Once again, this reporting structure appears to have the potential to overload the president and National Security Council (NSC) staff. To ensure the CTF director has the necessary level of authority, the PNSR study team says CTFs should be authorized by Congress and chartered by the president.⁶²

More recently, Jeffrey Buchanan et al., in a 2009 *Joint Force Quarterly* article, recommended establishing joint interagency task forces to make operational-level crisis operations both joint and interagency and provide command authority over all assigned interagency forces from the tactical level, through the JIATF commander, to a proposed regional interagency commander, to the president through the NSC.⁶³

Some have recommended establishing joint government task forces (JGTF) for interagency contingency operations, led by either the military or a civilian agency, based on which organization’s core competency most closely aligned with the primary mission of the task force. This means a civilian could have command of assigned military forces. The proposed JGTFs would have stronger command arrangements than the current counternarcotics JIATFs at SOUTHCOM and PACOM. In JIATF-S and JIATF-W, the task force commander has only tactical control of the participating units, while operational control remains with the parent agencies. The study recommends delegating

operational control to JGTF commanders, similar to a military-only JTF. It would also align the two current and any future standing JIATFs under the stronger JGTF model.⁶⁴ Still others recommend creating and deploying ad hoc IATFs for crisis operations. These interagency task forces would be task-organized to accomplish specific missions using the combined capabilities of the interagency and would have operational control and command authority over all forces assigned for planning, exercises, and mission execution.⁶⁵

A 2005 article in *Policy Review* recommended developing IATFs as needed for specific missions. These integrated task forces would be led by




Figure 5. Interagency task force model

a presidential special representative who would report directly to the president and would have an integrated headquarters staff of representatives from all relevant agencies. The article does not specifically address how the civilian and military components would relate, but presumably they would all fall under this integrated task force. The major concern with this model is the proposal to have the task force leader report directly to the president; a handful of integrated task forces responding to crises around the globe could quickly overload the president and the NSC staff.⁶⁶

State Department Leads

The second operational-level reform model for crisis operations would put the DoS in charge of an interagency task force. Interestingly, in two decades of reform literature there is no incidence of this model. However, the interagency country team led by the ambassador is standard for steady-state operations at all US embassies, so the model is worth considering for contingencies as well.

In a State Department lead-agency model, the USG would create an IATF similar to those described in the previous section, but the leader of the IATF would always be from the DoS. In countries with a functioning US embassy, the ambassador would be the logical choice to lead the IATF, since that position already has the responsibility to lead all US interagency activities in the country other than military forces involved in major combat operations. Where there is no functioning embassy or where the United States does not have diplomatic relations, the president could designate a special representative who would then report through DoS channels rather than directly to the president or national security advisor. This model is shown in figure 6.




Figure 6. State Department–led interagency task force model

Under this model, the MACV–CORDS structure would have been reversed, with the civilian CORDS director in charge of the overall US effort in Vietnam and the MACV commander subordinate and providing military support to the overall effort. Similarly, in the first year after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) administrator and presidential special representative (and ambassador) L. Paul Bremer would have been in charge of the overall US effort in Iraq with the military JTF in support, rather than the uncoordinated parallel structure that existed. The rationale for this proposal is that in complex operations, such as counter-insurgencies or postconflict stabilization and reconstruction, the desired end state is political, not military. While security is a necessary part of the overall effort, the years of frustration during America’s efforts in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan demonstrate that great military effort is often expended to achieve little in the way of strategic goals if it is not firmly di-

rected toward the overall political objectives. This model would attempt to put the right senior civilian with the right understanding of broad US goals in charge of the response.

Military Leads

The third reform model for crisis operations would put the military in charge of an interagency task force, as the United States did with the MACV–CORDS structure in Vietnam. Again, it is interesting to note that there has been very little discussion in the literature about this model, despite the fact that many historians and military analysts have praised the CORDS structure in Vietnam.

The only proposal of this type identified in the literature comes from a 2006 paper advocating a CORDS–like construct. The State Department’s S/CRS would create a civilian interagency organization that would be a subordinate part of a military JTF, as was done by MACV–CORDS in Vietnam (The military-led structure is shown in fig. 7). This study contends this would be better than the current JIACG and JIATF models, which try to achieve unity of effort without unity of command, and would also be better than the parallel structure frequently used today. The parallel structure mirrors the unsuccessful arrangement the US used in Vietnam prior to the establishment of the CORDS.⁶⁷




Figure 7. Military-led IATF model

A Parallel Structure

Finally, the fourth model would use a parallel civil-military structure with neither in charge of the overall effort. The most significant proponent of this structure is the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS); few others have proposed this model. The PNSR study team contends that “dual civilian and military chains of command in the field complicate unity of purpose and effort.”⁶⁸

Lt Col Harold Van Opdorp, USMC, in a July 2005 *Small Wars Journal* article, proposed a classic parallel structure, creating a “deployable JIACG” that would unify the civilian interagency presence in a country under a single organization that would operate in parallel with the military’s JTF.⁶⁹ Depending on the situation, either the deployable JIACG or the JTF would be the supported command with the other acting in support. During major combat operations, the JTF would be the supported command, while in a humanitarian response operation, the deployable JIACG would most likely be the supported command. Van Opdorp notes that many operational plans incorporate phases, and the supported/supporting relationship between the deployable JIACG and the JTF could change as the campaign phases change; for instance, the JTF passes the leading role to the deployable JIACG during the transition to postconflict stabilization and reconstruction operations.⁷⁰

The CSIS study team proposed a much more integrated task force structure but one which still has two leaders reporting in two separate chains of command to Washington, albeit with an integrated staff and a great deal of coordination. The CSIS team recommended establishing an IATF to integrate the day-to-day efforts of all US agencies participating in a crisis operation. The IATF would deploy to the field and would be jointly led by a military JTF commander and a civilian special representative appointed by the president.

The president’s special representative, who could be the US ambassador or another senior civilian of comparable stature, would be responsible for achieving the overall US objectives and would have directive authority over all US government civilians deployed to the field for the operation. The special representative would report to the president through the secretary of state. The JTF commander, a senior military officer, would be responsible for military operations, would have operational control over all US military forces deployed to the field for the operation, and would report to the geographic combatant commander, leaving the traditional military chain of command unbroken. While the special representative

would have no direct authority over the JTF commander, he or she would be able to raise disagreements to the NSC or the president for resolution.

Both the special representative and the JTF commander would be supported by a single, integrated interagency staff, composed largely of military personnel under the command of the JTF commander plus civilian personnel detailed from various agencies to work for the special representative. Where a functioning US embassy exists, the integrated staff would augment the existing country team, which would then become the support staff for the operation.⁷¹ The parallel structure proposed by the CSIS team is shown in figure 8.




Figure 8. Parallel-structure interagency task force model

Analysis and Recommendation

Past and current examples of organizational structures used by the United States across the range of counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, development assistance, reconstruction and stabilization, and natural disaster response missions are instructive. Examining the four proposed organizational reform models leads to the question of what criteria should drive the change of interagency operations.

Criteria for Change

From the many criticisms brought against the current interagency structure and the identified problems in both recent and ongoing operations, this article now proposes criteria by which to evaluate interagency reforms. Ideally, a better interagency structure would accomplish 13 things.

First, many observers argue that the military's role in foreign policy is too large, so a reform must be found that increases the ability of the DoS to lead US foreign policy across the interagency while lowering the military's profile. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen stated in 2005, "If we subvert, however unintentionally, our ability for the lead foreign policy agency of the US government [i.e., the DoS] to deliver credible and consistent messages . . . to those actors whose behavior we are trying to shape and change, we will lose influence and legitimacy."⁷² Also, a 2006 Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation concluded, "There is evidence that some host countries are questioning the increasingly military component of America's profile overseas."⁷³ Similarly, in June 2008, Secretary Gates warned against the "creeping militarization" of foreign policy and advocated for a larger role for the State Department.⁷⁴ More recently, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) ADM Michael Mullen stated, "US foreign policy is still too dominated by the military."⁷⁵

Second, the reform must produce better-coordinated planning at the operational level than is now achieved. There are numerous examples, such as the 1989–90 intervention in Panama and the 2003 invasion of Iraq, in which lack of coordination between agencies during the planning phase led to significant problems during execution, particularly when the military perceived it was time to transfer responsibility for the operation to another agency. In Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama, the military began contingency planning for regime change and postconflict operations in 1987, but for reasons of operational security did not discuss the plans with other agencies it assumed would play key roles until days before the December 1989 invasion.⁷⁶ In Operation Iraqi Freedom, planners from the military, the DoS, and the USAID developed separate postconflict plans. Ultimately, the plan the United States intended to follow for postconflict operations in Iraq was developed by the DoD, beginning in January 2003, without coordination with previous State Department or USAID efforts.⁷⁷ This lack of coordinated planning contributed to a slow start to US postconflict operations in Iraq, opening the way for the insurgency that developed.

Third, the reform also must produce interagency unity of effort during execution. Uncoordinated actions are wasteful of time and resources and can make it more difficult to accomplish US goals. For example, if the Army Corps of Engineers builds a school but the USAID does not assist

with funding for teacher training, the effort was wasted and may even be counterproductive if it leads the local population to doubt US abilities or commitment. A lack of unity of effort characterizes much of the US experience in Iraq. A 2009 GAO study stated, “Since 2005, multiple US agencies—including the State Department, USAID, and DoD—led separate efforts to improve the capacity of Iraq’s ministries to govern, without overarching direction from a lead entity to integrate their efforts.”⁷⁸

Fourth, any move to reorganize interagency structures and processes must lead to a system which is more effective—and perhaps more efficient—than the various agencies working alone, without the extra bureaucratic and resource overhead associated with interagency coordination.⁷⁹ Increased effectiveness is absolutely required, or the reform is counterproductive. Improved efficiency, while not required, is desirable. The PNSR study team notes that the current system “militate[s] against efficiency and effectiveness by undermining cooperation and collaboration . . . [in which competition] and information hoarding between agencies and their personnel is often standard behavior.”⁸⁰

Fifth, the reform should task leaders with clear responsibilities and give them the necessary authority to carry out those responsibilities. Prominent management theorist Lyndall Urwick coined two applicable concepts: the principle of authority, which says there should be a clear line of authority from the top of a management structure to every individual, and the principle of correspondence, which says a leader must be given authority commensurate with assigned responsibility. He argued that, no matter how complex the organization, these principles should be observed.⁸¹ Too often, today’s system of interagency coordination assigns responsibility but does not clearly define a chain of command or provide a leader with the needed level of authority over personnel, resources, or processes of other agencies.

Sixth, the decisions made by the leader or leaders must be perceived as legitimate and authoritative by participants outside the leader’s home agency. Organizational reform expert and current Air Force secretary Michael Donley⁸² notes, “Lack of complete authority and murky, unclear divisions of responsibility mean that legitimacy in decision making will be challenged.”⁸³ This is often the case in today’s system, where decisions by a leader from one agency are not perceived as binding by another executive branch agency.

Seventh, the leaders of the interagency process must have access to the necessary financial, personnel, and material resources from other agencies

to be successful in their assigned mission. For example, the DoS or the USAID is often tasked to accomplish a diplomatic or developmental mission, which it cannot achieve without the logistical or security resources provided by the military. In some cases, this issue will require congressional changes, as budgets are provided by Congress to individual agencies, and the executive branch has limited authority to realign resources among agencies.

Eighth, the leader and organization must have a clear chain of command to the president, who is the ultimate decision maker on foreign policy and national security issues. This is again Urwick's principle of authority, which requires a clear line of authority from top management to every individual. Structures which report generically to "the NSC" or in which multiple leaders in the field report to different leaders in Washington contribute to either undefined or multiple competing chains of authority to the president, violating this principle.

Ninth, the structure must not overburden the president and the national security advisory team, who need to be focused on strategic goals and policies rather than crisis decision making. The PNSR study team notes, "White House centralization of interagency missions . . . risks creating an untenable span of control over policy implementation . . . [This] tends to burn out National Security Council staff, which impedes timely, disciplined, and integrated decision formulation and option assessment . . . [and] almost guarantees an inability to do deliberate, careful strategy formulation." Any reform of the interagency system "must free the president and his advisors for strategic direction by providing effective mechanisms for decentralizing national security issue management."⁸⁴

Tenth, the reform should fix the imbalance of bureaucratic power and prestige between the Departments of State and Defense. The State Department is much smaller in terms of both budget and personnel than the Defense Department. The DoD has an annual budget of about \$660 billion and a workforce of approximately three million, while the DoS has an annual budget of about \$50 billion and a workforce of fewer than 60,000 people, of whom only 6,400 are FSOs.⁸⁵ The additional power is required to ensure the State Department's voice is heard during interagency deliberations, and additional prestige is required for the DoS to be able to obtain increased funding and personnel from Congress. Even Secretary Gates has argued that the DoS needs additional resources and capacity to participate in the interagency process, saying whole-of-government

approaches “can only be done if the State Department is given resources befitting the scope of its mission.”⁸⁶

Eleventh, for the coordinated interagency system to improve its capabilities over time, personnel from across the participating agencies need both training and experience working with other agencies. Reform options that routinely place working-level personnel from different agencies in contact with each other are more likely to produce this than stove-piped agencies working in parallel or achieving coordination only through small interagency cells.

Twelfth, any changes to the interagency system should minimize the financial, personnel, and materiel costs required to establish the new system. With a constrained federal budget, advocating any reforms to Congress and the various interests in Washington will be difficult if costs increase.

Finally, changes to the interagency system should attempt to minimize culture shocks in the participating agencies. Much has been written about the different cultures in the various organizations, particularly between the military and the DoS.⁸⁷ Reforms will be easier to advocate and implement if working-level personnel in the participating agencies do not perceive the new procedures as threats to their careers or their sense of self. Cultures can be transformed, but it takes a great deal of time and effort.

Evaluation and Recommendation

The most robust version of each of the four proposed structures was considered during the evaluation and assessed against the 13 criteria for change. Despite the derivation of a numeric score for each alternative, the evaluation scheme is qualitative and subjective. Though this model weights all criteria equally, it could be argued that some factors are more important than others. This analysis deliberately avoided that complication. The ratings for each of the four models are summarized in table 1.

The analysis reveals that an integrated interagency task force with a leader from the agency most appropriate to the mission is the best choice. The parallel structure used most often today is the worst of the four models, while the two lead-agency models fall somewhere in between.

The United States should establish integrated IATFs for crisis operations and enduring regional interagency missions such as counternarcotics. Each IATF would have a single director, a clear mission, resources, and authority commensurate with assigned responsibilities. The IATF director could be either military or civilian, depending on the security situation and which agency's core competency most closely aligned with the primary mission

Table 1. Analysis of operational-level interagency models

<i>Evaluation Criteria</i>	<i>Interagency Organization</i>	<i>DoS Leads</i>	<i>Military Leads</i>	<i>Parallel Structure</i>
Nonmilitary voice and face for US foreign policy	0	+	–	0
Fully-coordinated planning	+	+	+	0
Unity of effort during execution	+	+	+	0
More efficient and effective than agencies working alone	+	+	+	0
Leader's authority commensurate with responsibility	+	0	0	–
Legitimacy of leader's decision making	+	0	0	+
Leader can access necessary resources	+	0	0	0
Clear chain of command to the president	+	+	+	–
Does not overburden the president	+	0	0	–
Balance of power and prestige between DoD and DoS	0	+	–	–
Develops interagency expertise	+	+	+	0
Reform minimizes cost in money, personnel, and materiel	0	0	0	+
Reform minimizes agency culture shocks	0	–	0	+
TOTALS	+9	+6	+3	–1

of the task force, and could be designated as a presidential special representative if necessary to provide the leader more rank and authority, both internationally and domestically within the interagency. The IATF director would be supported by an interagency staff using an integrated civil-military chain of command. The IATF would be provided with the necessary personnel and resources from across the interagency, including the military, and the director would have operational control over all assigned forces.

Implementation Considerations

The IATF model would have worked in each of the aforementioned scenarios, but is especially applicable for current operations in Afghanistan. It likely would have avoided many of the problems the United States has faced through years of uncoordinated operations. Once the US Embassy was reopened in Kabul, civilian and military elements in Afghanistan

could have functioned as an IATF under overall supervision of the ambassador, with the commander of US military forces in Afghanistan as the ambassador's military deputy, producing unity of effort through unity of command rather than the personality-driven parallel structures, which have existed through most of the US involvement there. Alternatively, the IATF might include a larger operating area comprising both Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this case, the IATF director could be the president's special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the IATF would include the US embassies in both countries, as well as conventional military forces, special operations forces, and CIA covert action elements in both countries.

However, one must consider the requirements necessary to implement the new IATF model. These include overcoming bureaucratic resistance, obtaining diplomatic acceptance for this new construct from the rest of the world, minimizing the cost of the reform and finding a way to pay for it, addressing issues of agency culture and training interagency personnel, and obtaining congressional support and action.

Bureaucratic Resistance

One issue to address when implementing any reforms in USG executive agencies is the entrenched power of bureaucracies and their desire to preserve the status quo. While many military authors have proposed interagency reforms, relatively few proposals come from the State Department. This may be an indicator that those who hold bureaucratic power at the DoS are not in favor of reform along the lines advocated in this article. For example, the CORDS interagency construct used during the Vietnam War was largely supported by the DoD but opposed by non-DoD agencies, which continually tried to reduce the funding, personnel, and mission assigned to the CORDS.⁸⁸ Similarly, today there are those in the State Department—particularly in the Bureau of African Affairs and at US embassies across Africa—who do not support the establishment of the military's new US Africa Command.⁸⁹

DoS leaders may be concerned that the new IATF construct will require too many scarce DoS personnel and resources, making it impossible to properly staff and resource existing missions. This concern would best be addressed by increasing the State Department's budget and number of personnel, as Secretary Gates, CJCS Mullen, and many others have advocated for years.

Another group which may resist this reform is the American Foreign Service Association—the bargaining organization which protects the interests of US Foreign Service officers. FSOs may be concerned about the effects of these reforms on their career paths, such as whether interagency service will derail their careers or whether it will be required to advance to senior ranks in the Foreign Service. These concerns could be addressed by clearly describing the new career tracks for FSOs and offering suitable promotion, monetary, or other incentives for accepting these career paths.

Leaders in other agencies may also resist the new interagency construct because their personnel would report to leaders from another agency when serving at the IATFs, which would be perceived as a diminution of their power. As with the State Department, addressing the concerns of these leaders could include providing additional personnel and funding, clarifying and codifying their roles and authorities, and clearly delineating career paths in these agencies which lead to senior levels of leadership.

Diplomatic Acceptance

Achieving diplomatic acceptance from the rest of the world for this new construct is important but should not be a major challenge. When the United States conducts noncombat actions such as disaster relief, many host nations would prefer to work with an IATF headed by a USAID OFDA representative, for example, than one headed by a military officer. Similarly, in complex reconstruction and stabilization operations, host nations would probably perceive an IATF headed by a senior diplomat or development specialist, rather than a military officer, as more of an offer of assistance and less of a threat to their sovereignty. In those (hopefully few) cases of US military action in a nonpermissive environment, the IATF would likely be led by a military officer—at least initially—which would be welcomed by threatened governments in the region, while the perceptions of the target nation would be largely irrelevant.

Cost

Any reform of the interagency system becomes more difficult, or even impossible, as the projected cost increases. While it is beyond the scope of this article to conduct a detailed cost assessment of this reform, some ballpark estimates can be offered. Implementing the model should cost relatively little, since the envisioned IATFs would frequently be military-heavy organizations like today's JTFs and JIATFs, with the addition of interagency

personnel from embassy country teams, which currently often operate in parallel with the military structure. Thus, the IATF largely would use the same personnel and resources as in past and current operations but in a more integrated structure. A modest number of additional personnel from other agencies would be required; as few as 10 or 20 for a small operation to as many as a few hundred for a large, complex operation like the CPA's administration of Iraq prior to returning sovereignty to the Iraqi government. At any given time, from two to 10 IATFs would most likely be active around the world, leading to a surge requirement of perhaps 100–1,000 non-DoD personnel across the interagency, which would cost in the neighborhood of \$10–100 million in annual salaries, plus training, pensions, and other expenses.⁹⁰ However, if legislation were to shift this number of personnel billets from the DoD to the other agencies, this could be cost neutral, except for the additional training required. Shifting the billets makes sense, since the increased presence of the interagency in these operations would be expected to reduce the military workload, and the 1,000 DoD billets is less than one-tenth of one percent of its three million personnel.

Personnel and Culture

While funding the new model may not be difficult, recruiting and training the necessary new personnel for the non-DoD agencies could be much more challenging, since the skill sets in these agencies tend to require higher initial education than the average entry-level military position. It might take several years to recruit the necessary personnel and train them at the Foreign Service Institute, National Defense University, or other interagency schools.

Of perhaps greater importance is developing a true interagency career path. The 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (QDR) concurred, saying that “interagency operations would be strengthened by establishing a national security officer career path.”⁹¹ The 2010 QDR also addressed this issue, recommending that Congress “allocate additional resources across the government and fully implement the National Security Professional (NSP) program to improve cross-agency training, education, and professional experience opportunities.”⁹²

The Goldwater-Nichols Act created the joint military team, in part by requiring that all flag-rank military personnel have experience in a qualifying joint position. The combatant commands, the Joint Staff, and the many joint task forces also provide numerous opportunities for military

officers to gain experience working in the joint military environment at various points in their careers. While mandated interagency experience may or may not be required to qualify for senior leadership positions, the new IATF model would have to offer opportunities at several points in an individual's career to gain interagency experience at the working level, line supervisory level, and senior level if the United States hopes to create a cadre of experienced interagency professionals. Such a cadre would also benefit from opportunities to attend professional interagency education, analogous to professional military education, at one or more points in an interagency civilian's career. This would incur costs both for a school and instructors and for enough surplus personnel in comparatively small agencies to allow personnel to attend school while all critical billets remain filled.

It is also necessary to make interagency service an acceptable and even valued part of each participating agency's culture. Today, many professionals in the non-DoD agencies are strongly partial to their agency's culture and prefer to work only within that agency. Over time, this cultural isolation would need to change. A defined interagency career path and opportunities to attend school with personnel from other agencies would help, but most of all, this change would simply take time to evolve.

Congressional Support and Legislation

Large changes to the national security system above the single agency or department level would most certainly require action by the president and Congress. Some have argued that a presidential executive order would be sufficient to enact the proposed reforms.⁹³ While an executive order might change the interagency system during the current administration, history indicates it would be unlikely to remain under the next president.⁹⁴ For example, President Clinton's new process for interagency reconstruction and stabilization operations, described in Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56), did not outlast his presidency, nor was it generally followed while he was in office.⁹⁵ Nor does an executive order presuppose any support from Congress, which funds the executive branch agencies. Because political power in Congress is often strongly tied to the large sums of money associated with the defense budget, Congress will certainly want to be involved in any reforms that change the national security structure. The CSIS "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" study team noted: "The role of Congress in the process is the most crucial determinant of the prospects for a reform effort. The recommendations that flow from congressionally

mandated groups, commissions, or blue ribbon panels are more likely to lead to lasting changes than efforts launched exclusively at the executive branch level.”⁹⁶

Enduring change comes from legislation. Examples include the 1947 National Security Act which created, among other things, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense; the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act which created the joint military team; the 2002 act which created the Department of Homeland Security; and the 2004 act which created the office of the Director of National Intelligence.

Proper resourcing also comes from legislation. Michael Donley argues that if a new interagency structure is established in statute, “Congress has a more visible obligation to provide supporting institutional resources.”⁹⁷ The CSIS study team states that “Legislation could also provide the basis for realigning agency authorities and resources to ensure that each agency has the capabilities it needs to execute its assigned tasks.”⁹⁸ Because many of the complex operations which would benefit from execution by an IATF are unpredictable crises, budgeting for these IATFs would require some guesswork and flexibility by both Congress and executive branch agencies. The DoS and USAID budgets could include contingency funds in anticipation of a certain number of IATF operations each year, or funds could be provided to participating agencies through supplemental appropriations for particular crisis operations, as Congress has done for US operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. To facilitate unity of effort, the legislation authorizing these funds should include language which enables the transfer of funds between agencies and provides the IATF leader with some ability to prioritize interagency efforts and direct funding transfers when necessary within specified limits. To ensure oversight of these transfers, the legislation could require congressional notification of any transfers over a specified amount. While the capability for the IATF leader to direct transfer of funds would be new, the process of interagency funding transfer itself is not without precedent. For example, Section 1207 of the FY-06 National Defense Authorization Act permitted the DoD to transfer to the DoS “up to \$100 million in defense articles, services, training or other support for reconstruction, stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries,” and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, established by the FY-09 Supplemental Appropriations Act, permits the DoS to transfer all monies appropriated for this fund to the DoD or other federal agencies

so they can conduct operations to build and maintain the capability of Pakistani counterinsurgency forces.⁹⁹

Finally, legislation would be needed to place new interagency civilian leaders, such as a USAID OFDA expert leading a disaster-response IATF, in command of participating military forces and personnel from other US agencies. The United States already practices civilian control of the military, with the president and secretary of defense in charge of the military during both peace and war and the civilian secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy in charge of each service's organize, train, and equip (i.e., peacetime) missions. Additionally, US ambassadors direct interagency country teams, which generally include some military personnel at their respective embassies. So, the concept of placing civilians in charge of military personnel or personnel from one agency in charge of personnel from another is not without precedent. As with interagency funding issues, Congress could specify authorities and limitations in authorizing the IATF and could provide oversight through the congressional hearings process. Participating executive branch agencies could also elevate concerns and disputes to the National Security Staff and National Security Council process for resolution, when necessary, though it is hoped these disputes would decrease both in intensity and frequency as participating agencies become more comfortable with IATFs.

Obtaining congressional approval for the new reforms would not be easy. Previous reforms occurred largely in response to lessons learned from World War II, the failed hostage rescue mission in Iran, and the 9/11 attacks. Significant lessons from more than two decades since Goldwater-Nichols could motivate the necessary reforms, but these have not yet been enough to influence the president or Congress to devote political capital to a reform effort. Attempting changes across multiple agencies is particularly difficult in Congress because authority over the various agencies is distributed across multiple committees in the House and Senate. This not only requires the action of many different committees but also the understanding that power in the committees may shift based on the reform. For example, the proposed reforms would likely strengthen the House and Senate Foreign Relations Committees significantly, while diminishing the power of the Armed Services Committees.¹⁰⁰

There is at least some interest in Congress in assessing and addressing the lack of interagency unity of effort. On 30 April 2009, Rep. Randy Forbes (R-VA) sponsored the Interagency Cooperation Commission Act,

which would “establish a commission to examine the long-term global challenges facing the United States and develop legislative and administrative proposals to improve interagency cooperation.”¹⁰¹ However, the bill has no cosponsors and has been stalled in the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement, since 26 June 2009, with no plans for further action on the bill. Given the many other significant issues facing Congress at the time of this writing, coupled with the US drawdown in Iraq in 2011 and the anticipated drawdown in Afghanistan by 2014, there may simply not be enough congressional attention or interest to tackle a reform of this magnitude in the near future.

Conclusion

The US government conducts a range of deliberate and crisis-action operations abroad, including counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, counterterrorism, development assistance, reconstruction and stabilization, and natural disaster response. Expertise for these missions is spread across executive branch agencies, and generally, no single agency can accomplish these complex missions alone. In complex operations with participants from more than one US agency, coordinated planning and execution at the operational level is often lacking, leading to redundancies, gaps, friction, and frustration.

Organizational reforms proposed over the last two decades for these operational-level deliberate or crisis-action missions divide into four categories: an interagency organization, a State Department–led organization, a military-led organization, or a parallel structure. A comparative analysis of these four models, using 13 evaluation criteria, indicates an integrated interagency task force is the best organizational model for these operations. It also indicates that the parallel structure used most often today is the worst of the four models, while the two lead-agency models fall somewhere in between.

The United States should establish integrated IATFs for crisis operations and enduring regional interagency missions. Each IATF would have a single director, a clear mission, and resources and authority commensurate with assigned responsibilities. The IATF director could be either military or civilian, depending on the security situation and which agency’s core competency most closely aligns with the primary mission of the task force, and

could be designated as a presidential special representative to give the leader greater rank and authority, both internationally and domestically within the interagency. The IATF director would be supported by an interagency staff using an integrated civil-military chain of command. The IATF would be provided with the necessary personnel and resources from across the interagency, including the military, and the IATF director would have operational control over all assigned forces.

There are challenges to implementing this reform—including overcoming bureaucratic resistance, obtaining the diplomatic acceptance from the rest of the world for this new construct, minimizing the cost of the reform and finding a way to pay for it, addressing issues of agency culture and training interagency personnel, and obtaining congressional support—but none which cannot be surmounted. The new IATF construct would be substantially more effective in achieving US foreign policy and national security goals. It makes sense to expend the necessary effort. **SSQ**

Notes

1. US Agency for International Development, “USAID Afghanistan: US Government Agencies,” <http://afghanistan.usaid.gov/en/Page.USG.aspx>.
2. Richard W. Stewart, “Winning Hearts and Minds: The Vietnam Experience,” in *Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis*, eds. James Jay Carafano and Richard Weitz (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008), 90.
3. Ibid.; and Maj Ross M. Coffey, USA, *Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level: CORDS—A Model for the Advanced Civilian Team* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 25 May 2006), 24.
4. Maj Gen George S. Eckhardt, *Vietnam Studies: Command and Control, 1950–1969* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1991), 27, 29, 48, 69.
5. Coffey, *Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level*, 19, 24.
6. Ibid., 24, 26; and Stewart, “Winning Hearts and Minds,” 90–91.
7. Stewart, “Winning Hearts and Minds,” 94.
8. Coffey, *Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level*, 28–29.
9. Stewart, “Winning Hearts and Minds,” 105–6.
10. Ibid., 106.
11. Coffey, *Improving Interagency Integration at the Operational Level*, 3–4. See also John T. Fishel, “The Interagency Arena at the Operational Level: The Cases Now Known as Stability Operations,” in *Affairs of State: The Interagency and National Security*, ed. Gabriel Marcella (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 2008), 420–21.
12. US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” Joint Warfighting Center predocrinal research white paper no. 07-01, 21 November 2007, 14.
13. Ibid.
14. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, 13 June 2007; JP 3-05.1, *Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*, 26 April 2007; and JP 3-40, *Combating Weapons of Mass*

Destruction, 10 June 2009. JP 3-07.4 briefly describes JIAFT-S and JIATF-W but gives no broader doctrinal applications of JIATFs. JP 3-05.1 describes the JTF as the operational focal point for interagency coordination and mentions that the JTF may be assigned a subordinate JIATF to assist with interagency coordination. JP 3-40 provides the brief statement above but then notes “JIATFs currently do not have authority to conduct WMD interdiction.”

15. JFCOM, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” 14.

16. *Ibid.*

17. JFCOM, “Insights & Best Practices: Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Nongovernmental Coordination (A Joint Force Operational Perspective),” Joint Warfighting Center focus paper no. 3, July 2007, 14–15.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Recently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s International Security Assistance Force (NATO ISAF) and US Forces Afghanistan (USFOR-A) established three combined joint interagency task forces (CJIATF) to focus on the complex “nexus of insurgency, narcotics, corruption, and criminality” in Afghanistan. These include CJIATF-Nexus, CJIATF-435, and CJIATF-Shafafiyat. There is little information available about these new task forces, and even some question whether all three are actually CJIATFs under a subordinate commander or if they are elements of the USFOR-A, ISAF, or embassy staff. DoS, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, “US Counternarcotics Strategy for Afghanistan,” 24 March 2010.

20. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 427–28.

21. US Pacific Command (PACOM), “Joint Interagency Task Force-West,” <http://www.pacom.mil/staff/JIATFWest/index.shtml>. See also JP 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*, I-2; and Edward Marks, “PACOM, JIACG, and the War on Terror,” Camber Corporation on contract to the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group on Counterterrorism, PACOM, 18 August 2005, 17.

22. PACOM, “Joint Interagency Task Force-West.”

23. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 427–28.

24. JP 3-07.4, *Counterdrug Operations*, I-2.

25. Richard M. Yeatman, “JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success,” *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 42 (3rd Qtr. 2006): 27.

26. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 427–29; and Yeatman, “JIATF-South,” 26.

27. Marcy Stahl, *Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Training and Education Survey Results* (Vienna, VA: Thought Link, Inc., 15 January 2004), 43, www.thoughtlink.com/ppt/TLI-JIACGSurvey-FinalBrief-Revised.ppt.

28. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 429; JFCOM, “Insights & Best Practices,” 15; and LCDR Tom Stuhlreyer, USCG, “The JIATF Organization Model: Bringing the Interagency to Bear in Maritime Homeland Defense and Security,” *Campaigning* (Spring 2007), 42–43.

29. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 439. See also Yeatman, “JIATF-South,” 26.

30. Stuhlreyer, “JIATF Organization Model,” 43.

31. US Government Accountability Office (GAO), *Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing*, GAO-09-904SP (Washington: GAO, September 2009), 26.

32. Fishel, “Interagency Arena at the Operational Level,” 429.

33. Stuhlreyer, “JIATF Organization Model,” 42.

34. Gary W. Anderson, “‘Interagency Overseas’: Responding to the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami,” in *Mismanaging Mayhem*, 193.

35. Ibid., 194, 202.
36. Ibid., 195–96, 202.
37. Ibid., 195, 197–98, 202.
38. Ibid., 195, 204.
39. Ibid., 196, 198, 203.
40. A joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an element of a military combatant commander's staff composed of representatives from other USG agencies. These interagency personnel provide advice to the combatant commander and his staff, but cannot coordinate on behalf of their parent agency or commit personnel or resources from their parent agency. See JFCOM, *Commander's Handbook for the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG)* (Norfolk, VA: JFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, 1 March 2007).
41. Anderson, "Interagency Overseas," 195, 203.
42. Ibid., 194–95, 200.
43. Seth Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2009), 142.
44. Ibid., 139; and JFCOM, "Insights & Best Practices," 13.
45. Christopher J. Lamb and Martin Cinnamond, "Unified Effort: Key to Special Operations and Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 56 (1st Qtr. 2010): 44.
46. Jones, *In the Graveyard of Empires*, 150.
47. Lamb and Cinnamond, "Unified Effort," 43–44.
48. LT Joshua W. Welle, USN, "Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan: Creating Unity of Command," *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 56 (1st Qtr. 2010): 56. Lieutenant Welle was a civil-military planner for ISAF Regional Command South from November 2008 to August 2009.
49. US House of Representatives, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, "Agency Stovepipes vs. Strategic Agility: Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan," Committee Print 8, April 2008, 32.
50. Greg Bruno, "Afghanistan's National Security Forces," Council on Foreign Relations backgrounder, 16 April 2009.
51. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates at a 13 April 2009 NATO summit; quoted in Lamb and Cinnamond, "Unified Effort," 41.
52. GEN David Petraeus replaced GEN Stanley McChrystal as USFOR-A commander on 4 July 2010, though the civil-military structure established by Ambassador Eikenberry and General McChrystal remains relatively unchanged. However, the personal relationship between top civilian and military leaders and the commitment to unity of effort has improved.
53. Beth Cole and Emily Hsu, "Guiding Principles for Stability and Reconstruction: Introducing a New Roadmap for Peace," *Military Review* (January/February 2010): 15.
54. US Embassy–Kabul and USFOR-A, *United States Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan* (10 August 2009), 29–30, ii.
55. Ibid., 28–30.
56. Lamb and Cinnamond, "Unified Effort," 50.
57. The most significant prior studies on improving interagency unity of effort include the 2001 Hart-Rudman Commission report by a panel of DoD–chartered outside experts, the 2004 Defense Science Board study by another panel of DoD–chartered outside experts, the 2004 9/11 Commission report by a congressionally chartered bipartisan panel, the 2005 "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols" report from the CSIS, and the 2007 "State Department in 2025" study by a panel of DoS–chartered experts. Most recently, the Project on National Security Reform produced the 2008 *Forging a New Shield* and 2009 *Turning Ideas into Action* reports in response to

a requirement of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, which mandated a study of the interagency national security system by an independent, bipartisan organization. The US Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission), *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, Phase III Report*, 31 January 2001; Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, *Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities* (Washington: GPO, December 2004); *The 9/11 Commission Report*, 22 July 2004, <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf>; Clark A. Murdock and Michèle A. Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: US Government and Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era, Phase 2 Report* (Washington: CSIS, July 2005); Barry M. Blechman, Thomas R. Pickering, and Newt Gingrich, *Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy: Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group*, 2007, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/99879.pdf>; Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), *Forging a New Shield* (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, November 2008); and PNSR, *Turning Ideas into Action* (Arlington, VA: Center for the Study of the Presidency, September 2009).

58. Defense Science Board, *2004 Summer Study on Transition to and from Hostilities*, v, 32.

59. PNSR, *Forging a New Shield*, 526.

60. PNSR, *Turning Ideas into Action*, 56; and PNSR, *Forging a New Shield*, 538–39.

61. PNSR, *Turning Ideas into Action*, 57.

62. Ibid.

63. Jeffrey Buchanan, Maxie Y. Davis, and Lee T. Wight, “Death of the Combatant Command? Toward a Joint Interagency Approach,” *Joint Force Quarterly* no. 52 (Spring 2009), 95. At the time of their article, BG Jeffrey Buchanan, USA, was deputy commander for operations, Multi-National Division–Center, Iraq; CAPT Maxie Y. Davis, USN, was deputy, information technology and information resource management for deputy chief of naval operations, communication networks; and Col Lee T. Wight, USAF, was commander, 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB, Germany.

64. LCDR Darin M. Liston, USN, *In the Interagency Process, Mere Coordination Is Not Enough: Toward Joint Government* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 14 February 2005), 13, 15–16.

65. Lt Col Ted A. Uchida, USAF, *Reforming the Interagency Process* (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air Force Fellows, May 2005), 97.

66. Sunil B. Desai, “Solving the Interagency Puzzle,” *Policy Review* (February–March 2005).

67. Coffey, *Improving Interagency Integration at the Operation Level*, 40–42.

68. PNSR, *Forging a New Shield*, 243.

69. Lt Col Harold Van Opdorp, USMC, “The Joint Interagency Coordination Group: The Operationalization of DIME,” *Small Wars Journal* (July 2005).

70. Ibid.

71. Murdock and Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, 48, 51–52.

72. John Hillen, “The Changing Nature of the Political-Military Interface,” remarks by Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs John Hillen at the Joint Worldwide Planning Conference, Garmisch, Germany, 30 November 2005.

73. US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” 109th Cong., 2nd sess., 15 December 2006, S. Prt. 109-52, 2.

74. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, quoted in Gabriel Marcella, “Understanding the Interagency Process: The Challenge of Adaptation,” in *Affairs of State*, 39.

75. ADM Michael Mullen, USN, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Admiral Mullen's Speech on Military Strategy, Kansas State University, March 2010," http://www.cfr.org/publication/21590/admiral_mullens_speech_on_military_strategy_kansas_state_university_march_2010.html.

76. MAJ Mark L. Curry, USA, *The Interagency Process in Regional Foreign Policy* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 5 May 1994), 23–24.

77. Maj Robert S. Pope, USAF, *Interagency Planning and Coordination for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations* (Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College, April 2004), 8–9; and Johanna McGeary et al., "Looking beyond Saddam," *Time* 161, no. 10 (10 March 2003). See also George Packer, "War after the War," *New Yorker*, 24 November 2003.

78. GAO, "Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing," GAO-09-904SP, September 2009, 1–2.

79. Albert Zaccor, *Security Cooperation and Non-State Threats: A Call for an Integrated Strategy*, Occasional Paper (Washington: Atlantic Council of the United States, August 2005), 24–25.

80. PNSR, *Forging a New Shield*, 95.

81. Derek S. Pugh and David J. Hickson, *Great Writers on Organizations*, 3rd omnibus ed. (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2007), 149. Lyndall F. Urwick (1891–1983) had experience in both industry and the British Army, was director of the International Management Institute in Geneva and subsequently devoted himself to lecturing and writing about management.

82. Michael Donley is currently the secretary of the Air Force. His 30 years of government service have included positions as a professional staff member on the Senate Armed Services Committee, five years on the National Security Council staff, and positions in both the Department of the Air Force and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While on the NSC staff, Donley coordinated White House policy on the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act and both conceived and organized the President's Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management. While serving as a senior fellow at the Institute for Defense Analyses, he was a senior consultant to the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces and participated in two studies on the organization of the Joint Staff and the office of the CJCS. "Biography, Michael B. Donley," http://www.af.mil/information/bios/bio_print.asp?bioID=11336&page=1.

83. Michael Donley, *Rethinking the Interagency System, Part 2*, Occasional Paper #05-02, (McLean, VA: Hicks & Associates, May 2005), 9.

84. PNSR, *Forging a New Shield*, viii.

85. Louis J. Nigro Jr., "The Department of State and Strategic Integration: How Reinforcing State as an Institution Will Improve America's Engagement with the World in the 21st Century," in *Affairs of State*, 258–59; JFCOM, "Insights & Best Practices," 2; Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, "President's Proposed Budget Request for fiscal year 2011 for the Department of State and Foreign Operations," testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs, 24 February 2010; and Office of Management and Budget, "The US Department of Defense 2010 Budget," 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/fy2010_factsheets/fy10_defense8.pdf. Foreign Service officers (FSO) are commissioned officers of the US Foreign Service. They are the State Department's professional diplomats and fill most of the leadership roles at the DoS headquarters in Washington and at US embassies abroad, including about two thirds of ambassador positions (the other third are political appointees). FSOs are selected through a competitive written and oral exam process called the Foreign Service Exam. See Harry W. Kopp and Charles A. Gillespie, *Life and Work in the US Foreign Service* (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2008).

86. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, quoted in William I. Bacchus, "Regaining Relevance: Five Steps to Strengthen State," *Foreign Service Journal*, (July/August 2009): 14.

87. For example, see LTC Rickey L. Rife, USA, and Rosemary Hansen, FSO, *Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus: Improving Communications and Promoting National Security* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1 June 1998).

88. Stewart, "Winning Hearts and Minds," 106.

89. Broadcasting Board of Governors Office of Inspector General, *Report of Inspection: The Bureau of African Affairs*, Report no. ISP-I-09-63, August 2009, 13.

90. Based on a rough cost of \$100,000 in salary per person.

91. DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2006, 79.

92. DoD, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 2010, 71. The National Security Professional Development (NSPD) program was initiated by Pres. George W. Bush by Executive Order 13434, "National Security Professional Development," 22 May 2007. According to the Congressional Research Service, the NSPD program has accomplished little, and EO 13434 excludes the military, the Foreign Service, and the intelligence community from the program, citing concerns it would detract from these agencies' already established education and training paths. The CRS recommends congressional legislation and oversight to improve the NSPD program. See Catherine Dale, *Building an Interagency Cadre of National Security Professionals: Proposals, Recent Experience, and Issues for Congress*, RL34565 (Washington: CRS, 8 July 2008).

93. PNSR, *Turning Ideas into Action*, 19.

94. "Executive-driven reforms often lack staying power. . . . The executive branch in the 1990s often sought to use existing agencies for new purposes through the exercise of executive fiat rather than seeking broad, bipartisan reforms. The result was the 'bending' of legacy institutions to new missions, often using Presidential directives and executive findings. . . . These executive-driven innovations had their uses . . . but rarely carried over into successive administrations." Murdock and Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, 147. See also Maj J. D. York, USMC, *Militarizing the Interagency* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 14 February 2005), 13.

95. MAJ Thomas M. Lafleur, USA, *Interagency Efficacy at the Operational Level* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 26 May 2005), 17–22; and Donley, *Rethinking the Interagency System*, 5.

96. Murdock and Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, 146.

97. Donley, *Rethinking the Interagency System*, 8.

98. Murdock and Flournoy, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols*, 34.

99. Nina M. Serafino, *Department of Defense "Section 1207" Security and Stabilization Assistance: A Fact Sheet*, CRS report RS22871 (Washington: CRS, 7 May 2008), 1; and Public Law 111-32, 24 June 2009, 1895.

100. Ben Lieberman, "Crisis! What Crisis? America's Response to the Energy Crisis," in *Mismanaging Mayhem*, 125.

101. US House of Representatives, "Interagency Cooperation Commission Act," 111th Cong., 1st sess., H.R. 2207, 30 April 2009, 1.